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The Institutionalisation of Power Revisited: 
Presidential Term Limits in Africa 
Denis M. Tull and Claudia Simons 
Abstract: In Africa, a seemingly growing number of attempts by presi-
dents to overcome or abrogate term limits, or make them otherwise inef-
fective, has ignited a debate about the significance of constitutional engin-
eering, and its implications for the rule of law, democracy, and the nature 
of politics in general. In light of recent instances of “third-term bids,” we 
revisit the hypothesis about the institutionalisation of power in Africa and 
challenge the assumption that, over the past two decades, African politics 
have experienced a fundamental change away from “big man” rule towards 
the rule of law. Based on a comprehensive stocktaking of the state of play 
of term limits and third-term bids, we analyse broader trends and out-
comes of legal and constitutional engineering. We argue that an analysis 
focusing exclusively on formal institutions and procedures misrepresents 
the extent of political change by ignoring power and authority in many 
African countries. While the growing salience of formal institutions is un-
deniable, we suggest that they matter more as a legitimisation of the power 
of political leaders than as a constraint to it. 
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In August 2015 Pierre Nkurunziza was again sworn in as president of 
Burundi. His successful attempt to secure a contested third term has 
plunged the country into a severe crisis, in which so far approximately 500 
people have been killed and more than 280,000 forced to flee. Only 
months later, in December 2015, a constitutional referendum allowed Paul 
Kagame in neighbouring Rwanda to seek another term in order to con-
tinue his rule as president beyond the end of his second term in 2017. In 
April 2016 Congo-Brazzaville’s president Denis Sassou-Nguesso was re-
elected amidst violent protests over a constitutional amendment that had 
abolished both term limits and the age restriction for the president. Since 
2015, tensions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) have 
grown, as President Joseph Kabila, in the opinion of many, has been 
manoeuvring to secure a prolongation of his rule in the face of term limits. 
These and other events mirror a fundamental controversy that has 
recently reverberated across sub-Saharan Africa – namely, how often 
presidential incumbents can be candidates to their own succession.1 The 
controversy over “third-term bids,” attempts by rulers to stay in power 
beyond the constitutionally prescribed maximum number of terms, 
matters. Politically, there is a perception that a growing number of Afri-
can incumbent presidents seek to extend their rule via varieties of con-
stitutional engineering to circumvent or abrogate term limits. This runs 
counter to the 1990s, when Africa’s democratising political systems em-
braced presidential term limits as an antidote to the often calamitous 
long-term presidencies of autocratic rulers. For example, in Benin, the 
country that led Africa’s third wave of democratisation, the post-authori-
tarian constitution of 1990 introduced term limits after the demise of 
long-term ruler Mathieu Kérékou, who had been in power since 1972. 
The preamble of the new constitution alluded to the country’s past by 
stressing the people’s “fundamental opposition” to “dictatorship,” the 
“confiscation of power,” and “personal power” (constituteproject.org n.d. a). 
Some countries, such as the DRC, went even further by enshrining term 
limits in their constitutions in perpetuity to guard against long-term per-
sonal rule (constituteproject.org n.d. b). The rejection of personal rule and the 
support for term limits is perceptible at the level of public opinion. A 
recent survey across 34 African countries found that 73 per cent of citi-
zens favour term limits (Dulani 2015), perhaps partly because elections 
offer only slim chances to oust incumbents, making term limits all the 
more relevant (Bogaards 2013; Maltz 2007). 
1 Two caveats: We consider only sub-Saharan Africa, thereby excluding Algeria, 
Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Our analysis is limited to presidential systems. 
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Analytically, the term-limit debate can serve as a window into a 
much larger question concerning the institutionalisation of political 
power – that is, the extent to which government is restrained by formal 
institutions, including laws and constitutional norms. It overlaps with 
and is a key element of the rule of law to the extent that the state is sub-
ordinated to law (Versteeg and Ginsburg 2017; Møller and Skaaning 
2014; VonDoepp 2005: 37–39). Compliance with the extant legal regime, 
including the constitution, is a major test case of institutionalisation. 
Term limits are a particularly relevant indicator in this respect. Not 
only are they constitutional norms and thus a key part of the legal re-
gime, but their aim – limiting the duration of office for a president – 
goes to the very core of political power. Therefore the apparent fre-
quency of “third-term bids” raises doubts about the extent of institution-
alisation of political power in Africa. If the constitutional engineering 
that takes place is essentially reflecting the political will and power of the 
executive, the efficacy of the separation of powers and the ability of 
other institutional mechanisms meant to circumscribe executive power 
to actually do so can reasonably be thrown into doubt. By analysing 
third-term politics, we are interested in the actual exercise of power and 
the question of what one particular politically salient phenomenon – 
term limits and third-term bids – reveals about incumbency politics and 
power in present-day Africa and the extent to which they are restrained 
by institutions.2 
The article is organised as follows: First, we briefly sketch the debate 
about political institutionalisation. In the second section, we provide a 
comprehensive stocktaking of the state of play of term limits and third-
term bids across sub-Saharan Africa, categorising all instances (cases) from 
1990 to 2016 in which rulers approached the end of their second term, 
thus facing the choice between leaving office (term-limit compliance) and 
seeking an extension of power via term-limit circumvention. The third 
section offers a typology of three pathways that these incumbents use to 
evade term limits. In the fourth section, we explore possible factors that 
induce autocratic incumbents to formally respect term limits (rather than 
simply flouting the respective constitution). The fifth section analyses the 
relationship between term-limit compliance and the democratic quality of 
regimes. Finding that term-limit violators are almost always autocrats, we 
offer a cost–benefit analysis that seeks to explain why they seek to formally 
comply with term limits, when the substance of their action is to circum-
2 For an interesting early take on the role of former incumbents in national politics 
in the broader context of democratisation and term-limit politics, see Southall and 
Melber (2006). 
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vent them. We conclude that the institutionalisation of power is broadly 
limited to democratic states. The example of term limits suggests that sub-
Saharan autocrats are resilient and skilful in manipulating formal institu-
tions to entrench and legitimise their power.3 
Term Limits and the Institutionalisation of 
Power Hypothesis
The spreading of political liberalisation across Africa since the early 1990s 
has in many countries proven conducive to the flourishing of formal in-
stitutions of political life, and sometimes even to the rule of law (Cabanis 
and Martin 1999). In a pioneering article, Posner and Young (2007) de-
scribed this process as the “institutionalisation of power.” The term serves 
to describe a shift away from the clientelistic, opaque decision-making of 
“big men” rulers in Africa’s presidentialist, neo-patrimonial systems. In 
such systems formal political institutions were insignificant, as rulers had 
the discretionary power to ignore or override formal institutions and laws, 
turning government into a highly personalised exercise, guided by the 
interests and whims of the ruler and his entourage. Posner and Young 
argue that significant political changes since 1990 have subjected African 
rulers to more constraining formal institutions such as competitive elec-
tions, judicial institutions, constitutions, laws, and regulations than they 
faced in the past, in terms of both politics and policymaking.  
The most obvious manifestation of the institutionalisation of power 
is the way in which political leaders come into office or leave power. The 
spread of multiparty elections in Africa indicates that political elites by 
and large accept the necessity to periodically acquire political legitimacy 
through the ballot box. The larger point is that politics is progressively 
regulated through formal norms and procedures. Posner and Young 
show that formal rules have replaced violence and other extraconstitu-
tional means as the most important way of coming to, staying in, and 
leaving power. In their study of 46 African countries, they find that be-
tween the independence era of the early 1960s and 2005, the number of 
presidents that left power through unconstitutional means (coup, violent 
overthrow, assassination) decreased over time. By the 1990s, these cases 
had become a minority. Between 2000 and 2005, more than 80 per cent 
3 The authors would like to thank Andrea Sperk for her research assistance and 
the reviewers for their constructive suggestions. We also thank Pierre Englebert 
for his feedback on previous versions of this paper and for his generous help 
with the statistical analysis. 
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of African leaders left power through natural death, resignation, or elec-
toral defeat (Posner and Young 2007: 128–130). This trend, they argue, is 
best explained by the fact that leaders are more constrained by formal 
rules, driving them to accept electoral defeats even when they prefer to 
stay in power (Posner and Young 2007: 137). Posner and Young also 
show that those incumbents bent on extending their rule did not choose 
to violate constitutional rule; instead, they changed or circumvented 
constitutions. Posner and Young interpret this as evidence of a substan-
tial change in African politics, away from arbitrary rule and towards for-
mal constraints on executives (Posner and Young 2007: 138).  
This proposition has been contested. While many observers concede 
that formal rules and institutions in Africa have become more important 
over time, considerable scepticism persists as to the scope and extent of 
the transformation (Akech 2011; Lynch and Crawford 2011: 283–285; 
Joseph 2014; Nwosu 2012). For most researchers, politics in Africa re-
mains characterised by the coexistence of informal and formal institutions: 
“big men politics” on the one hand and some progress towards more rule-
bound politics on the other, although the former is often assumed to 
dominate the latter.4 The tension between the two is put into relief by 
studies that explicitly address the rule of law (Fombad 2016; Stroh and 
Heyl 2015).  
In the following section, we examine the empirical record of term-
limit compliance or subversion in Africa since 1990. 
Taking Stock: Presidential Term Limits and 
Constitutional Change 
By considering all formal democracies in the period between 1990 and 
2016, we have identified a total of 39 instances of an incumbent president 
reaching the end of his last – usually second – constitutionally permitted 
term.5 He (all were men) had then to decide whether to step down in con-
formity with the constitution or find another way to stay in power.6  
4 Among a vast body of relevant literature, see, for example, Diamond (2008); 
Bates et al. (2012); Englebert and Dunn (2013); Cheeseman (2015). See also 
Englebert (2009); Prempeh (2008); Albaugh (2011); Piccolino (2014); and Van 
Cranenburgh (2008), as well as the contributions in Bach and Gazibou (2012), es-
pecially those by Gazibou and Van de Walle. 
5 Our sample consists of all formal democracies. We exclude Eritrea, as its consti-
tution, including the regulation of term limits, has not been implemented since its 
ratification in 1997; Mauritius, as its president is only ceremonial; Comoros, be-
cause it has a rotating presidency; and Ethiopia, which has term limits, but where 
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Figure 1 contains the 39 cases in which an incumbent reached the end 
of his last term. It also contains the nine countries where the constitution 
stipulates term limits but where these have yet to be reached by an incum-
bent (left column). 
We classified the 39 cases in three groupings. Our criterion is 
whether in any given case in which an incumbent reached the end of his 
final term, formal measures were taken to allow for a prolongation of 
rule. By formal measures we mean the submission of a constitutional 
amendment or an entirely new constitution for approval by competent 
institutions (parliament, senate) or mechanism (referendum). By resort-
ing to this formalistic approach, which has the advantage of permitting 
objective coding, we exclude cases that were not clear cut – for example, 
Benin under President Boni Yayi, as the incumbent did not take formal 
measures to evade term limits, although the public seemed to be con-
vinced that he was keen to launch a third-term bid. 
We do not assess whether constitutional engineering was deliberately 
undertaken in order to permit a president to extend his rule. In some cases, 
amendments allowed for the prolongation of rule without touching term 
limits. This was the case, for example, in Senegal in 2012 and Sudan in 
2005. Arguably, the Sudanese constitution that came into effect after the 
secession of South Sudan was not primarily introduced to allow incumbent 
President al-Bashir a prolongation of his rule. However, it had the same 
effect, as it permitted a “reset” of his tenure. Our definition of formal 
measures includes cases in which incumbents have filed an official appeal 
with a constitutional court to examine their eligibility for a third term, a 
legal prerequisite for the incumbent to run again. This included Burundi 
and Senegal, where it was contested whether a previous mandate by the 
incumbent counted as a term or not, which could have barred him from 
running again. When one or more formal measures permitted the incum-
bent to do so, we code the case as successful in circumventing term limits. 
Cases in which formal measures were submitted but failed to find approval 
through competent political or judicial institutions are defined as unsuc-
cessful. If one institution opposed the bid for a third term but another 
                                                                                                    
de facto power sits with the prime minister. The Gambia, Guinea-Bissau, Leso-
tho, South Sudan, and Somalia do not have constitutionally fixed term limits.  
6 The same country and even the same president can count as more than one case, 
such as Compaoré in Burkina Faso, who tried twice to overstay his terms (suc-
cessfully in 1997, unsuccessfully in 2014) or Namibia’s Nujoma, who rewrote the 
constitution in 1999 but stepped down in 2004. However, we count Burundi’s 
president Nkurunziza’s recent third-term bid as a single case, although he under-
took two distinct attempts to force it: first in 2014 and then in 2015.  
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endorsed it (e.g. in Burundi, where parliament rejected a constitutional 
revision but the constitutional court declared President Nkurunziza eligible 
anyway), we consider the case as successful.7  
The first observation is that only in just over half of all cases (21 out 
of 39) did a president choose to step down after his final term without 
attempting to rewrite or reinterpret the constitution (right column, Fig-
ure 1). In other words, nearly every second incumbent in Africa is not 
prepared to respect his country’s constitutional term limits. The fact that 
this proportion has not changed since 2005 (Posner and Young 2007: 
137) indicates that the institutionalisation of power has made little or no 
progress over the past decade.8 
Moreover, the vast majority of these attempts (15 out of 18) were 
successful. This hints at a substantial incumbent advantage in managing 
and controlling the process of circumvention. It suggests that obstacles 
to amending constitutions are relatively easy to surmount, whereas the 
costs of political-legal engineering are low compared with the envisioned 
return. Also noteworthy is the fact that every single incumbent who was 
successful in circumventing or modifying constitutional term-limit provi-
sions also won the subsequent polls (bar one: Senegal’s Wade).9 In other 
words, electoral victory is virtually guaranteed once an incumbent has 
overcome constitutional obstacles to his candidature. Favourable out-
comes of third-term elections might be explained by the incumbency 
advantage (including both fair and unfair means to run elections) or the 
fact that voters might put more trust in incumbents than in the opposi-
tion despite their support for term limits (Grömping and Martínez i 
Coma 2015; Bishop and Hoeffler 2014; Logan 2008). 
Overall these observations suggest that sitting presidents, if they de-
cide they want to stay in power, can be confident that they will meet 
their objective. This concerns both the move to change or otherwise 
circumvent the constitution and a successful re-election. 
7 This makes for a somewhat different coding than the one that Posner and Young 
(2007) used. For example, we do not code Zambia (2001) as an unsuccessful at-
tempt. Although President Chiluba arguably planned to amend the constitution to 
allow himself a third term, he never officially submitted an amendment. Also in 
contrast to Posner and Young, we consider Niger (2009) a successful case, as 
President Tandja not only held (and won) a referendum, but had the referendum 
legalised against all odds by an (arguably puppet) constitutional court. 
8 Dividing the past 15 years into five-year periods, we find that the share of 
third-term violators hovers between 40% and 44%. 
9 Niger is an exception, as elections had not taken place before President Tandja 
was ousted by a coup in February 2010.  
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Figure 1. Sub-Saharan African Countries with Term Limits 
The end of a presi-
dent’s final term 
has not been 
reached since 
term limits were 
introduced.* 
The end of a final term has been reached at least once since the 
introduction of term limits.  
At the end of a president’s final term, 
formal measures were taken that 
allowed the incumbent to run again  
in elections.  
At the end of a president’s 
final term, no formal 
measures were taken and 
the incumbent left office. 
Successful  
(N=15) 
Unsuccessful 
(N=3) (N=21) 
Angola 
Central African 
Republic 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Equatorial 
Guinea 
Liberia 
Madagascar 
Mauritania 
Seychelles 
Zimbabwe 
Burkina Faso  
(Compaoré 1997)  
Burundi  
(Nkurunziza 
2015) 
Cameroon 
(Biya 2008) 
Chad 
(Déby 2005) 
Congo-
Brazzaville 
(Sassou-Nguesso 
2015) 
Djibouti 
(Guelleh 2010) 
Gabon 
(Bongo 2003) 
Guinea 
(Conté 2001) 
Namibia 
(Nujoma 1999) 
Niger  
(Tandja 2009) 
Rwanda 
(Kagame 2015) 
Senegal 
(Wade 2012) 
Sudan  
(al-Bashir 2005) 
Togo 
(Eyadéma 2002) 
Uganda 
(Museveni 2005) 
Burkina Faso 
(Compaoré 
2014)  
Malawi 
(Muluzi 2002)  
Nigeria 
(Obasanjo 2006) 
 
 
Benin 
(Kérékou, 2006,  
Yayi 2016) 
Botswana 
(Mogae 2008) 
Cape Verde 
(Monteiro 2001;  
Pires 2011) 
Ghana 
(Rawlings 2001;  
Kufuor 2009) 
Kenya 
(Moi 2002;  
Kibaki 2013) 
Mali 
(Konaré 2002) 
Mozambique 
(Chissano 2004;  
Guebuza 2014) 
Namibia 
(Nujoma 2004;  
Pohamba 2014) 
São Tomé and Príncipe 
(Trovoada 2001;  
de Menezes 2011) 
Sierra Leone 
(Kabbah 2007) 
Tanzania 
(Mwinyi 1995;  
Mkapa 2005;  
Kikwete 2015) 
Zambia 
(Chiluba 2001) 
Average demo-
cratic quality** 6.50 8.60 10.17 
Source: Freedom House 2016; Freedom in the World 1973–2016. 
* In Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe term limits were respectively introduced  
in 2010, 2011, and 2013, and the corresponding long-term presidencies of Dos Santos 
(since 1979), Obiang (since 1979), and Mugabe (since 1987) continue. In the Central 
African Republic, Liberia, Mauritania, Seychelles, and Madagascar presidents never 
reached their final term as they retired prematurely or were ousted by coups. 
** Average democratic quality in the five-year period prior to the end of the second term. 
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Interestingly, the 21 instances where term-limit compliance was observed 
are distributed across just 12 countries. If we narrow our focus to the 
countries where term limits have been respected at least twice (a sign of 
the consolidation of the norm), a group of eight countries remains, with 
a combined number of 16 cases of compliance among them. Conse-
quently, if term-limit provisions have become a broadly continental phe-
nomenon, with 38 African countries having them included in their con-
stitutions at some point since the 1990s, the effectiveness of the norm is 
limited across the region. A second observation is that in all cases where 
presidents sought to extend their power, they circumvented term limits 
by resorting to legal mechanisms and procedures. We have recorded 15 
cases in which the circumvention of term limits was successful. 
Figure 2. How Incumbents Circumvent Term Limits 
Mechanism Cases 
Change of constitution through 
parliament/senate 
Namibia (1999), Togo (2002), Gabon (2003), 
Cameroon (2008), Djibouti (2010),  
Rwanda (2015) 
Change of constitution/intro-
duction of new constitution 
through popular referendum 
Burkina Faso (1997), Guinea (2001),  
Chad (2005), Uganda (2005), Sudan (2005), 
Niger (2009), Rwanda (2015),  
Congo-Brazzaville (2015) 
Court ruling legalising  
third-term bid 
Senegal (2012), Burundi (2015) 
 
In two cases (Senegal 2012, Burundi 2015), incumbents exploited legal 
ambiguities and constitutional loopholes – that is, third-term eligibility 
was “legalised” through the decision of a constitutional court (see 
Vandeginste 2015, 2016). In both cases, this followed parliament voting 
against a constitutional amendment. Though in the case of Burundi the 
court decision was in no small part a result of political pressure, it under-
scored the desire of President Nkurunziza to remain within the bounda-
ries of law.  
In the remaining 13 cases, constitutional amendments were valid-
ated by lower and/or upper houses of parliaments, popular referendum, 
or both. In five of those cases the constitution was changed through a 
parliamentary and/or senate vote, and in seven of the cases the constitu-
tion was changed or a new constitution introduced through a popular 
referendum. In Rwanda, the constitution was changed through votes of 
both parliament and senate and subsequently endorsed by referendum 
(see below). The 2009 third-term bid of President Tandja of Niger is an 
especially contested case where a referendum was used, given that it was 
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held amid a state of emergency, a dissolved parliament, and an opposi-
tion boycott. Even so, it is striking that Tandja made efforts to remain 
within formal rules, though of course these were radically changed in his 
favour.  
The fact that all presidents manoeuvred within formal rules rather 
than acting through extraconstitutional means supports the proposition 
by Posner and Young that constitutions and institutional frameworks 
have gained significance compared to the pre-1990 period when uncon-
stitutional tactics were common.10 Apparently, present-day rulers have a 
keen interest in being perceived as complying with rules and laws.  
Figure 1 also indicates that Francophone countries are far more 
likely to witness third-term bids than the rest of Africa. Among the 
21 presidents who arrived at the end of their second mandate and did 
not try to change the constitution, only three hail from Francophone 
Africa: Kérékou and Yayi (Benin, 2006 and 2016) and Konaré (Mali, 
2002). While the proneness of Francophone countries to abrogate term 
limits is difficult to explain, it is tempting to assume that it may be linked 
to the particular nature of the political system inherited from colonial 
rule, especially a particular brand of presidentialism. Perhaps as a flipside 
to the Francophone and largely West and Central African bias just dis-
cussed, it seems remarkable that half of all compliant cases are situated in 
East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania) and Southern Africa (Botswana, Mozam-
bique, Namibia). 
A second obvious proposition emerging from the cases is the power 
of political precedent in shaping the decisions of incumbent presidents. 
As already noted by Posner and Young, not a single incumbent has tried 
to change the constitution if a precedent of term-limit compliance had 
been set in his country (Posner and Young 2016: 13). The outstanding 
example is Tanzania, where two presidents (Benjamin Mkapa in 2005 
and Jakaya Kikwete in 2015) have stepped down at the end of their sec-
ond terms, following the example set by President Ali Mwinyi in 1995. 
The fact that Mwinyi’s predecessor, Julius Nyerere, had also relinquished 
power – though unrestrained by term limits, but as one of the few Afri-
can leaders to step down before the 1990s – may be part of a wider story 
that underlines the potential influence of precedent in terms of norm 
setting and socialisation. These cases are the clearest evidence of effect-
ively restraining term limits. 
10 This is not to say that presidents did not resort to altogether questionable 
means as a complementary strategy. In many cases, demonstrations were bru-
tally suppressed, opposition politicians killed, etc.  
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We conclude that term-limit compliance is a phenomenon that di-
vides the universe of African cases into two parts: roughly half of all 
leaders who arrive at the end of their second term step down in con-
formity with the constitution, whereas the second half sets out to cir-
cumvent term limits, most often successfully. The fact that presidents 
almost always win the subsequent elections could, if nothing else, testify 
to the power of incumbency that term limits seek to minimise. In other 
words, the ease with which presidents manage to extend their duration in 
office underscores the main argument in favour of term limits – namely, 
incumbents’ overwhelming advantages at the polls.11 Without term lim-
its, they manage to stay in power by virtue of controlling institutions and 
electoral outcomes. 
Thus, term-limit compliance since 1990 certainly marks important 
progress compared to the pre-1990 period. But the empirical record does 
not suggest that formal institutions have displaced informal ones and that 
these formal institutions effectively restrain the power of incumbent rulers. 
The evidence that every second president is not prepared to respect the 
constitution and does manage to circumvent term limits clearly exposes 
the vulnerability and limited effectiveness of constitutional norms. What is 
more, this has not improved over the past decade. It could be argued that 
formal rules of power extension apply more than before but not in a re-
strictive way. This is the case despite the fact that legal engineering pro-
vides a formal façade.  
Leadership Duration despite Term Limits 
At the time of writing (2016), the presidents of Equatorial Guinea, Angola, 
and Congo-Brazzaville had been in power since 1979; the former two have 
ruled their country continuously for the past 37 years, while Sassou-
Nguesso’s rule in Congo-Brazzaville was briefly interrupted between 1992 
and 1997. Cameroon has not changed its president for 34 years. Uganda’s 
president has been in office for 30 years, and Zimbabwe has had the same 
head of state for 29 years. Sudan’s president has been in power for the past 
27 years, his counterpart in neighbouring Chad for 26 years, and the Dji-
boutian president for 17 years. Rwanda’s president has been in power since 
2000 and will theoretically be able to rule the country until 2034, which 
would amount to 31 years of uninterrupted presidential tenure. Burundi 
11 Unfortunately, we are not able to determine whether elections in these cases 
were free and fair. Relevant databases often show considerable gaps in regard 
to African cases. 
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will have had the same president for 15 years in 2020 if the incumbent 
Nkurunziza reaches the end of his current term.12  
Figure 3. Long-Term Presidents despite Term Limits as of 2016 
President  Start and length of ongoing rule  
as of the end of 2016  
Dos Santos (Angola) 1979– (37 years) 
Obiang Nguema (Equatorial Guinea) 1979– (37 years) 
Sassou-Nguesso (Congo-Brazzaville) 1979–1992; 1997– (32 years) 
Biya (Cameroon) 1982– (34 years) 
Museveni (Uganda) 1986– (30 years) 
Mugabe (Zimbabwe) 1987– (29 years)* 
al-Bashir (Sudan) 1989– (27 years) 
Déby (Chad) 1990– (26 years) 
Ismael Guelleh (Djibouti) 1999– (28 years) 
Paul Kagame (Rwanda) 2000– (27 years) 
Average length of rule 30.7 years 
* Mugabe had already served as prime minister since 1980, an office that was abolished 
in 1987 when the office of executive president, with more powers, was created. 
These countries present something of a puzzle. On the one hand, they 
are ruled by some of the longest-serving presidents worldwide. Africa’s 
ten longest-serving presidents have been in power for an average of 30.7 
years (Figure 3). And yet all of them have introduced term limits at some 
point in time since the early 1990s.13 These cases illustrate a tension 
between the continent-wide spread of constitutionally enshrined term 
limits throughout the 1990s and their apparently limited impact. We 
observe a coexistence between de facto personal rule and a formal rule 
meant to depersonalise (thus formally institutionalise) political rule. The 
depersonalisation of term limits has two dimensions: Concerning its 
application, the norm is depersonalised in the sense that it should be 
applied universally, to all individuals. In terms of substance, the norm 
seeks depersonalisation as it aims to separate rule from ruler: no single 
individual should be allowed to rule for more than a fixed number of 
years. As a result, there is a wide gap between the constitutionally pre-
scribed maximum number of terms and the political reality, reflected by 
remarkable leadership duration. How is this possible?  
To address this question, we have categorised the cases into three 
groups. First, there are cases where term limits were scrapped the very 
12 President Blaise Compaoré ruled Burkina Faso for 27 years, until a political crisis 
led to his downfall in 2014. 
13 In most countries, presidential terms last either five or seven years.  
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moment they would have forced the incumbent to resign. This was the 
case in Djibouti, Cameroon, Chad, Uganda, Guinea, Gabon, Togo, and 
Niger. In all of these countries, term limits were introduced in the early 
or mid-1990s before they were scrapped between 2005 and 2010. Take 
the example of Chad’s president, Idriss Déby. Following his successful 
coup d’état in 1990 and a transitional period lasting six years, Chad’s new 
constitution was adopted through a referendum in 1996, which pre-
scribed a limit of two presidential terms (five years each). Déby was re-
elected in 2001. In light of rising domestic and international concerns 
over the questionable circumstances under which these elections were 
held, Déby sought to appease the concerned parties by promising to 
respect the constitution: to not seek a third term in 2006. In 2005, how-
ever, the increasingly repressive government called a referendum that 
endorsed the removal of presidential term limits, enabling Déby to be re-
elected in 2006 and again in 2011 by a wide margin and amid boycotts by 
opposition parties. During the 2016 presidential elections, Déby won a 
lopsided first-round victory, handing him a fifth consecutive term in 
office. By the end of the current mandate, Déby will have been in power 
for 31 years. 
Second, in some cases incumbents managed to prevent term limits 
being applied to them. In Angola, Equatorial Guinea, and Zimbabwe, 
term limits were only introduced in 2010, 2011, and 2013, respectively, a 
point in time when the presidents of these countries – Dos Santos 
(1979–), Mugabe (1987–), and Obiang Nguema (1979–) – had already 
been in power for more than two decades. Since newly introduced term 
limits were not applied retroactively, these presidents may have poten-
tially many years in office ahead of them. In Equatorial Guinea, a limit of 
two seven-year terms was introduced, only two years after President 
Obiang’s re-election (2009). This enabled him to serve out his term be-
fore the new term-limit rule could apply, beginning with the mandate in 
the wake of the 2016 elections. Hence, Obiang is currently serving the 
first (2016–2023) of two possible terms and can stand again in 2023, in 
which case a re-election until 2030 would mean that he has served for 41 
years.14 In Sudan, term limits were introduced in 2005 with the adoption 
of a new constitution after the secession of South Sudan. Due to a five-
year transitional period, President al-Bashir only officially ran in the 2010 
elections. He could thus run again in 2015, although he has already been 
in power since 1993. President Compaoré of Burkina Faso is a more 
14 It is somewhat incongruous that while President Obiang has consistently won 
above 93% of the vote, when term limits were introduced via a constitutional 
referendum the move was endorsed by an even larger majority of voters (97%). 
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complex, but similar example: Compaoré took power in a coup in 1987. 
After having been scrapped in 1997, term limits were reintroduced in 
2000 due to internal and external pressure. On the same occasion, presi-
dential terms were reduced from seven to five years. Compaoré, who had 
won the 1998 elections, thus finished his seven-year term, as the new 
legislation did not apply retroactively. This enabled him to win elections 
in 2005 and 2010. The recent decision by Burundi’s constitutional court 
to allow Nkurunziza to run for another term in 2015 represents yet an-
other variety of term limits that are written down in law but do not play 
out in the political reality. Nkurunziza had been ruling the country for 
ten years. Constitutionally speaking, however, he had served only one 
five-year term, considering that for the first term he was not elected by 
universal suffrage but by parliament and senate.  
Third, it needs to be emphasised that in some cases constitutions and 
term limits have neither been scrapped nor ignored. Rather, tailor-made 
solutions for incumbents were deployed the moment term limits would 
have forced them to leave office. A particularly striking case is Rwanda. 
After having served as an interim president between 2000 and 2003, 
Kagame was elected for a full seven-year term in 2003 and re-elected in 
2010 for a second term due to expire in 2017. In November 2015, a con-
stitutional revision was approved by both houses of parliament and later 
endorsed by a popular referendum. The revised constitution maintains a 
two-term limit, but reduces the length of a term to five years. However, 
before coming into force, the new provisions will be preceded by a “tran-
sitional presidential term” of seven years (2017–2024) for which any presi-
dential candidate, including President Kagame, will be eligible (Article 172) 
to stand. Thus the amended presidential two-term limit will only take ef-
fect after the end of the next (“transitional”) seven-year term. In other 
words, President Kagame, who has already declared his readiness to run 
again, could theoretically rule Rwanda until 2034. “No law stops him,” the 
speaker of the Lower House told a news conference after the chamber’s 
approval of the revised constitution (Unwiringiyimana 2015). Thus al-
though Rwanda’s former and current (revised) constitution both foresee a 
two-term limit, Kagame would be able to rule the country for a total of 31 
years in full compliance with the law.  
Namibia and Congo-Brazzaville were precursors to the approach 
taken by Rwanda. Namibia’s 1990 constitution, which contained term 
limits, was changed in 1999 to allow President Nujoma, in power since 
1990, to run for a third term. However, the two-term limit was not 
scrapped, but amended for Nujoma only. All subsequent presidents have 
since been limited to two terms. Nujoma stepped down in 2004 because 
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his party did not want to change the constitution again. In Congo-Braz-
zaville, long-term president Sassou-Nguesso was allowed to run again in 
2015 not because term limits were scrapped, but because the number of 
terms was extended to three and, equally important, the upper age limit 
for a presidential candidate (70 years) was abolished. Therefore, the rule 
of the now 72-year-old president, which began in 1979, continues.  
Performing Institutions: A Cost–Benefit Analysis 
As mentioned before, the vast majority of African countries introduced 
term limits under the impetus of the “third wave” of democratisation. 
While it is obvious that this has not led to democracy in many places, the 
question about the relationship between term-limit compliance and de-
mocracy remains potentially important to exploring why some countries 
comply with term limits while others evade them.15 For instance, 
Cheeseman has advanced the hypothesis that the democratic quality of a 
political system influences the likelihood that incumbents will stand 
down at the end of their second term (Cheeseman 2016). The proposi-
tion sounds plausible but has not been examined systematically.16  
We tested the democratic quality of the political systems in the 
countries under consideration before incumbents arrived at the end of 
their mandate.17 Using Freedom House data for each country, both for 
political rights and civil liberties, the comparison of democratic quality 
across our three categories of cases provides statistically significant re-
sults that reveal a clear and important pattern. Countries where no third-
term bid was made were significantly more democratic in the preceding 
five-year period than countries where the attempt to change the consti-
tution was successful.18 Thus, the state of democracy in a given country 
15 We define a “democracy” as a political system in which citizens enjoy basic 
political and civil rights and get to vote in free and fair elections. 
16 Posner and Young (2007: 137) have deliberately eschewed this question. 
17 To have greater confidence in the overall democratic quality of a country and 
to minimise the impact of specific single events that may influence the scores, 
our comparison takes into consideration the democratic quality of a country 
over the five-year period preceding the decision point. For each five-year pe-
riod, we then calculated the average values of the inverted sum of Freedom 
House’s political rights and civil liberties before computing the average score 
for each category of cases. 
18 The first group averages a combined score of 10.1 on an inverted cumulative 
political rights and civil liberties Freedom House score, while the latter averages 
6.5. The difference of 3.6 is statistically significant at the 1% level, suggesting 
the variance between the two groups largely exceeds the variance within each 
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is a very strong predictor of whether an incumbent president will launch 
a third-term bid or not. The separation of powers and other checks and 
balances are likely to be more solid in more democratic countries and 
may thus impose stronger restrictions on a ruler who is considering his 
options.19 Importantly, it also suggests that democracy renders term 
limits effective in a context of powerful presidentialism and the many 
advantages of incumbency. In other words: Africa’s political landscape is 
divided between formal term limits and binding term limits, and this dis-
tinction corresponds with the democracy variable.  
If our test of democratic quality demonstrates that autocrats are 
highly unlikely to respect term limits, it still does not tell us why these 
rulers seek to legally circumvent term limits, rather than simply ignoring 
or suspending potentially constraining constitutions. In a way then, it 
could be argued that they perform formal rules and institutions in a the-
atre-like fashion – that is, they do not comply with constitutional norms 
in substance, but manage to change or circumvent these norms. This 
permits them to formally stay within the boundaries of laws and consti-
tutions and thus give the impression of legality (Figure 2). 
Why do they make these painstaking efforts? We suggest that incum-
bents formally respect institutions simply because they can afford to do so 
– that is, they successfully manipulate these institutions in the sense that 
they evade the constraints that these are meant to impose and even turn 
them to their advantage. We also posit that a cost–benefit analysis tells 
autocrats that these considerations are closely interconnected: the per-
ceived necessity for rulers to perform institutions and rules cannot be 
decoupled from their ability to control the political process, once they 
decide to submit themselves to formal rules and institutions.  
First, if the willingness of autocrats to play by third-term rules is 
determined by their ability to get their way (in terms of term-limit eva-
sion), their expectation in that regard is largely correct. Our data show 
that autocratic incumbents have a successful track record, with only 
three out of 18 incumbents having failed in their attempts to change 
constitutions (Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Malawi). Of course, this success 
rate (83 per cent) could be misleading, as it may be the case that incum-
bents launch third-term bids only if they are overwhelmingly confident 
                                                                                                    
category of regime. An analysis of variance using three groups (no attempt, un-
successful attempt, and successful attempt) yielded an F value of 9.2, also sig-
nificant at the 1% level. 
19 Our democracy test also shows that those countries where third-term bids are 
launched but fail are significantly more democratic than those countries where 
these attempts are successful. 
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that they will succeed. However, we find little evidence of this in our 
data. Only two autocratic incumbents in our sample did not pursue a 
third-term bid (Mwinyi in Tanzania in 1995 and Moi in Kenya in 2002). 
All other autocrats launched third-term bids and were successful, both in 
terms of circumventing term limits and in winning re-election. Con-
versely, among all successful third-term bids, only Namibia was a democ-
racy at the time of the bid (1999). In other words, any autocratic ruler is 
very likely to launch a third-term bid, and this is so because he is highly 
likely to succeed. We thus posit that there is a causal link between being 
an autocrat and the prospect of a successful third-term bid. 
Second, the likelihood of success means that the costs of circum-
venting or otherwise manipulating institutions and rules are low. Local 
and external third-term opponents have little leverage to hold incum-
bents to account inasmuch as they can claim to adhere to their country’s 
laws and constitutions. This legalism is evident in third-term bids that 
did not involve the outright scrapping of term limits, but where legal 
arguments (e.g. Burundi) or constitutional engineering (e.g. Rwanda) 
provided the judicial cover for term-limit evasion. Burundi is particularly 
illuminating inasmuch as President Nkurunziza stressed the constitu-
tional legality of his third-term bid whereas his opponents were forced to 
resort to political arguments (Vandeginste 2016).  
Third, the benefits of playing by the rules are high to the extent that 
formal compliance provides rulers with a degree of legal and ultimately 
political legitimacy that is rarely questioned.20 For example, neither in 
Burundi nor in other cases did donors play a major role in effectively 
pre-empting or sanctioning a third-term bid. It is true that Western do-
nors have recently articulated their opposition to third-term bids, occa-
sionally even in outspoken fashion (Stewart 2014; Mugisha 2015). But 
for all their rhetoric, to our knowledge, not a single incumbent has been 
the target of some form of sanctions related to his third-term bid (for 
example, a suspension of development aid).21 Whereas outright viola-
tions of constitutions such as coups are now likely to provoke muscular 
responses from regional and international actors, formal engineering to 
evade term limits does not. 
20 Burkina Faso is the obvious recent exception. It is also an example that a third-
term bid can indeed serve as a rallying cry for opponents.  
21 Sanctions by various donors against Burundi were driven by human rights viola-
tions, not by the third-term bid, though arguably the two were interconnected. 
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Conclusion  
We interpret the resulting picture as evidence of the remarkable resilience 
of Africa’s autocratic rulers and their strong capacities of adaptation to 
changing environments. These rulers are extremely successful not only in 
staying in power, but in maintaining power through legal means and, since 
1990, in a new democratic context. This resilience belies the assumption 
that the exercise of power is in the midst of a transition to more rule-based 
politics that restrain autocratic powerholders as opposed to democratic 
rulers. This should not come as a surprise. Africa’s autocrats have demon-
strated their adaptive skills in the face of changing and often adverse cir-
cumstances for many decades, whether in the context of the Cold War, the 
economic crisis of the 1980s and the concomitant structural adjustment 
programmes, or in terms of their adaptation to “democracy” in the early 
1990s (Van de Walle 2001; Englebert 2009; Cheeseman 2015). Thus, term-
limit evasion is another manifestation of historical continuities. And as in 
previous periods, African autocrats have not just proven their skill in soft-
ening or eluding political pressure – it is fair to say that these rulers have 
turned these threats to their advantage, in the process legitimising and 
entrenching their power. If it has been noted that autocratic rulers have 
managed to turn democratic institutions such as elections or parliaments 
into tools of political domination, the same conclusion can be drawn with 
respect to the term-limit challenge in that it has strengthened their power 
vis-à-vis both outside donors and local foes (Haggard and Kaufman 2016: 
127; Albaugh 2011: 394–395).22 
The use of formal institutions such as law and legal processes is not 
new. For example, Akech (2011) has convincingly demonstrated that 
such formal institutions have always been important tools in political 
contests. Arguing against the dichotomous account of African politics as 
either informal and neo-patrimonial or formal and rule-based, he finds 
that the existence of neo-patrimonialism and “imperial presidencies” is 
not evidence of the absence or failure of formal law. Rather, they are 
enabled and facilitated by formal law, as it is in fact the “breadth of for-
mal power” that “facilitates informal and unaccountable uses of it” 
(Akech 2011: 97). Similarly, Englebert (2009: 62) argues that it is ulti-
mately “legal command, that is, the capacity to control, dominate, ex-
tract, or dictate through the law” that is the enduring feature of African 
states. Law thus has a double function in African politics: it is the most 
important foundation of politics and subsequently the means to bypass 
22 For a discussion on the lack of “true competitiveness” in African elections, see 
Cho and Logan (2013) and Bogaards (2013). 
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or hollow itself out. While African politics and administration are char-
acterised by a prevailing legalism, it is largely bereft of the normative 
substance of the law. To a large extent, legal command is thus an auton-
omous source of power, but this does not preclude the necessity for 
autocratic rulers to adapt to a changing international context in which 
donors may call for formal compliance with certain norms. That even 
the most despotic among Africa’s rulers see the need to formally comply 
with constitutional term limits, as evidenced by their practice, leads us to 
presume the existence of external constraints, but ones that autocratic 
rulers skilfully handle through legal-political engineering reminiscent of 
Bayart’s “strategies of extraversion” (Bayart 2000). 
The fact that autocrats see a political usefulness in performing in-
stitutions and rules should not be construed as evidence of institutional 
constraints. The ease and success with which they manipulate these in-
stitutions (here: term limits) suggests that these same institutions are 
used to maintain rather than constrain power. In social science terms, 
institutions require a certain degree of stability in order to influence be-
liefs and actions and, ultimately, outcomes. To disregard the fact that 
Africa’s dictators have an impressive success rate in bending institutions 
to their will is to ignore the fact that the concept of institutions has been 
stripped of its core substance (Przeworski 2004). 
We have described a sharp division between two types of cases (and 
countries): In a group of 18 cases (across as many countries), incumbents 
were not prepared to respect the constitution and launched bids to evade 
term limits. In a second group, comprising 21 cases across 12 countries, 
term limits were respected, sometimes repeatedly – for example, in Tan-
zania and the small island states of Cape Verde and São Tomé and Prín-
cipe. As regards institutionalisation, this is encouraging as it suggests that 
respect for the constitution may be more engrained in those countries, 
perhaps as a result of precedence, norm setting, and institutional learn-
ing. Importantly, we have seen that the democratic quality in a given 
country is a very strong indicator of whether a president will launch a 
third-term bid. While incumbents in more open political systems tend to 
be governed by institutions (binding term limits), autocratic rulers are 
very likely to be term-limit evaders, even if they pre-empt outright viola-
tions by taking recourse to legal engineering – that is, changing the con-
stitution before the restraint on leadership duration can bite.  
If we use term limits as an indicator, Africa’s autocrats are arguably 
not more constrained by institutions post-1989 than they were before, in 
contrast to the region’s democrats. These autocrats continue to prove 
their capacity to adapt to different institutional and political settings (Van 
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de Walle 2001; Levitsky and Way 2010; Cheeseman 2015). Africa’s auto-
cratic states do not seem to be transitioning to more rule-based politics, 
even if the façade is suggesting just that. 
The ease and success with which autocrats have their way is the 
starkest and most obvious evidence that power trumps institutions. By 
tailoring constitutions to suit their personal preferences, the very notion 
of the rule of law (or institutional constraints) – abstract, universally ap-
plicable, and independent of individuals – is undermined. Thus, while the 
number of unconstitutional changes of government has sharply dropped 
in Africa since 1990, the instrumental use of the law, regarding term limits 
in particular, points to the legitimisation of autocratic power rather than 
institutionalisation through rules and regulations. This is obvious in 
countries where long-term presidents did not even need to scrap term 
limits altogether (e.g. Rwanda) as well as in countries where term limits 
were introduced and abrogated various times at will to serve the hold on 
power of the incumbent (e.g. Uganda). In such places, focusing on the 
mere existence of formal institutions tells us little about the actual exercise 
of power. Worse, it may actually prevent us from understanding the resili-
ence of authoritarian regimes that use certain institutions such as term 
limits, elections, or parliaments as “instruments of authoritarian domina-
tion” (Haggard and Kaufman 2016: 127).  
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Die Institutionalisierung von Macht auf dem Prüfstand: 
Mandatsbeschränkungen für Präsidenten in Afrika 
Zusammenfassung: Die anscheinend zunehmenden Versuche von Präsi-
denten in Afrika, Mandatsbeschränkungen zu umgehen, abzuschaffen oder 
auf anderem Wege auszuhebeln, haben eine Debatte über die Bedeutung 
von Verfassungsänderungen und deren Folgen für Rechtsstaatlichkeit, 
Demokratie und die Politik generell ausgelöst. Im Lichte jüngster Versuche 
von Präsidenten, sich eine dritte Amtszeit zu verschaffen, überprüfen die 
Autoren die These der Institutionalisierung von Macht in Afrika. Sie hin-
terfragen die Annahme, dass sich die politischen Systeme in Afrika im 
Verlauf der letzten beiden Jahrzehnte grundlegend gewandelt haben – von 
der „Big-Man“-Politik hin zur Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Auf der Grundlage einer 
umfassenden Bestandsaufnahme der Bedeutung von Amtszeitbeschrän-
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kungen und der Versuche, sie zu umgehen, analysieren sie Trends und 
Ergebnisse juristischer und verfassungsrechtlicher Manipulationen. Die 
Autoren argumentieren, dass eine Analyse, die ausschließlich auf formale 
Institutionen und Verfahren fokussiert, die Reichweite des politischen 
Wandels verkennt, weil sie die tatsächlichen Autoritäts- und Machtstruktu-
ren in vielen afrikanischen Ländern außer Acht lässt. Zwar ist der Bedeu-
tungszuwachs formaler Institutionen offenkundig, nach Einschätzung der 
Autoren liegt ihre faktische Bedeutung jedoch mehr in der Legitimierung 
von Macht als in deren Beschränkung. 
Schlagwörter: Afrika, Politisches System, Regierungssystem, Demokratie, 
Rechtsstaatlichkeit/Rechtsstaat, Regierungswechsel/Machtwechsel 
